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**From:** Chris Wilson [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, 17 May 2010 1:28 PM  
**To:** Blair, Joanna  
**Subject:** Response to Montara Inquiry Preliminary Report

Joanna,

I received the Draft Preliminary Findings report from Mallesons Stephen Jaques. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to respond to the report. Below are my comments for your consideration.

- 1.3 a ii. In my opinion this is speculation. Whilst the well was designed to have tail cement above the top of the reservoir, the lead cement was of a sufficiently robust design to have prevented wormholes from occurring. I believe there is more evidence to the contrary of this point.
- 1.4 a i. I suspect if the 9 5/8" PCCC was not working properly then an uncontrolled release would likely have occurred earlier as the well had been in that state (with the 9 5/8" PCCC installed) for 5 months. So whilst it might be "therefore possible" it should be noted that it is "highly unlikely" as well.
- 1.14 This statement has errors. This statement implies the 16.5bbbls comes from below the float collar and this is not the case. It took 9.25bbbls (I think) to achieve the 4000psi. There was already pressure on the casing prior to this that would equate to about 2.5bbbls of compressed fluid so ~11.75bbbls of fluid was return from above the float collar meaning 4.75bbbls came from below the float collar.
- 1.52 a. The H1 well was not drilled horizontally for nearly 1000m, it was in fact only about 400m when the 9 5/8" casing was set.
- 1.57 As mentioned in my comment in 1.14, prior to increasing the pressure on the casing to 4000psi the casing already had pressure applied to it that would have compressed ~2.5bbbls of fluid leaving 4.75bbbls to return from below the float collar. The fluid in the annulus (lead and tail cement) would have had a significantly higher hydrostatic pressure than the fluid in the reservoir (hydrocarbons). The fluid that would have returned into the casing would have been cement not hydrocarbons. Two things that would have prevented the hydrocarbons coming into the casing are 1) basic physics – that is the fluid with the least resistance to flow would have flowed first (that being the cement in the annulus) and 2) whenever a well is flow tested, the mud filtrate comes out of the formation first, not hydrocarbons.
- 1.58 a. See comments for 1.57
- 1.60 If implicating personnel onshore at this point, it should be noted that I (as an onshore person) was not given all the facts at the time and this hampered my decision making capability.
- 1.61 The decision (or advice from me to the offshore team) to shut it and apply pressure was made not knowing that fluid had been pumped back in. Had that been known by me at the time something different would have done. The pressure of 1350psi bled-off on its own down to 687psi (not reported to me at the time either). As such in my mind the pressure had been bled from 1350 psi to 0psi (or atmospheric pressure) and no flow was observed. Again had I known about the bleed-off in pressure at the time this would have lead to a different course of action.
- 1.78 Whilst I respect the position the commission has taken with respect to information being supplied in some reports sent to Perth based personnel about the cementing operation, I feel that I should note the following;
  - It is important for a Drilling Superintendent to have all information at hand to make decisions. Burying important information in reports that are sent down several days after the event (in this case the cementing report) and also placing notes in the DDR that is read the following day is not "good oilfield practice".
  - The information that was presented in these reports was NOT conveyed to me verbally on the

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day – that is crucial.

- I agree I gave evidence at the commission that had I read that information in the reports I may have come to the conclusion that we had a problem and I stand by that, however I know what my job is like and I also know the responsibilities of the Drilling Supervisor offshore. For an accurate timely decision an accurate picture of what has happened offshore needs to be conveyed to the Drilling Superintendent – not just “noted” in reports to see if I find it later!
- 1.104 As for 1.78. Whilst I don’t disagree entirely with what is said, the information that was not communicated was critical and still should not have been left to be found in documents, some of which are sent down several days later.
- 1.107 In the text of the DDR it should read [1350 psi] not [1350 PSA]
- 1.121 This statement is harsh and unnecessary in my opinion. If the commission was to spend a week or two performing my role they would have a better understanding of my position. I have worked offshore long enough and read enough daily drilling reports (onshore and offshore) to have a suitable baseline for what is good and what it not. This statement is the opinion of the commission and I don’t believe the commission has a good enough baseline for this opinion.
- 1.132 Be that as it may, all of the reports offered have a wide audience and no one (inside or outside PTTEP) picked-up on it.
- 1.155 Section 10 of the WCS manual states that cement (does not specify lead or tail) needs to be 100m above the top of the reservoir. Further down section 10 where it deals with neat cement it states this must be 50m above the reservoir. Just for clarification neat cement is tail cement. So what we aimed for was within our standards.
- 1.156 My comments on 1.57 cover this.
- 1.170 d Mr. Treasure was rostered on the rig from April 16, the day of the supposed installation of the 13 3/8” PCCC
- 1.181 Whilst I take some responsibility for not telling Mr. Millar, his direct report (the OIM) did not inform him either.
- 1.196 I had planned to inform Mr. Millar about the cap removal at my morning meeting. For whatever reason it appears no morning meeting was held that day (likely because Mr. Millar was unable to make it). It was a very busy day for me as I was on my own in the office on what was effectively our first day of SIMOPS. It appears there has been no regard for circumstances at the time just that we (or me) felt it was a lack of significance – which is wrong.
- 1.213 The last paragraph should be re-worded. Having seen the e-mails to the manufacturer about the PCCC’s, I disagree with what they say. The PCCC’s are manufactured for a pressure rating. If they were not designed for pressure containment why design them as such! I will deal with this by separate e-mail.
- 1.247 Drilling Program 1B was written on the premise that the casing shoe was a barrier and that when the rig was on location only one barrier was required. It was NEVER our intention to place time and cost savings ahead of well control. A lot of work went into the sequencing of the tie-back work and factors that effected the sequence included equipment handling (from a safety perspective) and how best to install the wellheads and cut casing now an MLS was involved (which was not part of the plans when the wellheads were first purchased). I feel the commission does not have a good perspective on other inputs to the drilling program when making its comment in 1.247.
- 1.248 d Because that was what was known and reported at the time the program was written!
- 1.275 Drilling oil and gas wells is a very expensive business. All personnel are looking for ways to perform tasks more efficiently, however at no time would anyone from the PTTEP team knowingly accept an efficiency over safety.

In addition to my comments above, I would like to ask that consideration be given to the replacement of names with job positions. My continual naming is causing hurt to me and my family and is now having a financial impact through my ability to find alternative work since leaving PTTEP.

Thanks again for the opportunity to comment.

Regards

Chris

Chris Wilson