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22 December 2009

Montara Commission of Inquiry
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Dear Mr Borthwick

Re: Submission to the Montara commission of Inquiry

The Australian Conservation Foundation is very grateful for the opportunity to submit to the Montara Commission of Inquiry.

Our submission briefly describes the marine values of the Kimberley area, details the lessons that must be heeded from the oil spill disaster, and provides some recommendations to the Commission of inquiry on the action that our Federal Government must take to ensure that our marine environment is protected in the face of major petroleum industry expansion.

ACF has serious concerns about the industry and government response to the spill and the weakness of the ongoing regulatory arrangements for protecting Australia's marine environment from the impacts of the petroleum industry.

We are also concerned that public hearings may not be held as part of the Commission of Inquiry. ACF wishes to make a presentation during the hearings.

One of our key recommendations is that a moratorium over further oil and gas exploration or new production needs to be immediately established in response to the Montara oil spill until the Commonwealth's marine bioregional planning process is complete.

Should you require any further information associated with this submission, please contact ACF's Healthy Oceans Campaigner, Chris Smyth, at c.smyth@acfonoline.org.au or 0438 123 536.

Yours sincerely

Paul Sinclair
Manager
ACF Healthy Ecosystems Program

Australian Conservation Foundation submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry

22 December 2009

1. Recommendations

ACF urges that the following recommendations be made to the Federal Government:

1. Establish an independent scientific panel to assess threats from oil and gas to Australia's marine and coastal regions, and provide recommendations on how to manage future new oil and gas exploration and production.
2. Review petroleum industry regulation, and not approve further areas for oil and gas exploration and production until the current marine planning process is complete. This should include an increased oversight by the Environment Minister.
3. Impose heavy penalties on companies that breach Federal safety requirements and environmental conditions.
4. Properly integrate protection of the environment into all decision-making and legislation, and enhance the powers of the *EPBC Act*.
5. Invest more in strategic environmental assessment processes which are more directive and enforceable on planning of resource extraction projects.
6. Create an Australian Oceans Act that would establish an Oceans Authority to prepare and implement bioregional marine plans and coordinate assessment and approvals processes for development proposals such as those from the petroleum industry.
7. Consistent with the legislative framework of an Oceans Act, develop a comprehensive, spatial, integrated and ecosystem-based marine plan for the North-west Marine region. This should have a network of marine sanctuaries at its core that protects each marine habitat. It should also include various marine management zones between the sanctuaries that are used to manage the interaction of human activity with the marine environment. The plan should be based on a broad-scale regional planning process (not the narrow one currently in process) using the best available scientific, traditional and local knowledge. The plan should ensure that the management of catchment, coast and marine areas is integrated.
8. Substantively improve risk assessment processes and risk minimisation strategies, emergency response procedures and capabilities, environmental and technical monitoring and oversight and the institutional and regulatory framework.
9. Include substantial resourcing in Budget forward estimates for the management of these marine sanctuaries, and for increased oil spill monitoring and coordination.
10. Avoid further major industrial development in pristine environments like the Kimberley.

2. The marine environment affected by the Montara Oil Spill Disaster

The Kimberley marine and coastal environment is of international significance and home to dolphins, dugongs, whales and a treasure trove of other marine species.

The inshore and coastal ecosystems comprise probably Australia's most biodiverse tropical ecosystems, with unique and iconic values. Ashmore Reef, for example, has the highest known diversity and density of sea snakes in the world. More than 200 islands are important for remote and undisturbed nesting of a number of species of seabirds, and there is critical habitat for the west coast population of humpback whales that migrate annually to the area for calving (part of what has been dubbed as a marine life super highway). There also important breeding and feeding habitat for threatened species including dugongs, green turtles, loggerhead turtles and hawksbill turtles, and important staging points for migratory wetland birds, especially waders.

These values are now under serous threat from an expansion of the petroleum industry and will be subjected to a number of ecological, economic, social and cultural risks.

Risks to the ecology of the area include risks to its largely unspoilt biodiversity values and its marine productivity (e.g. fish and prawn spawning and nurseries), and to its Ramsar wetland sites. There are also risks to economic activity in the area, including the fishing, pearling and tourism industries with flow-on effects to dependent industries. The risks to social and cultural values include those to recreational fishing and indigenous cultural activities which are reliant on a healthy marine environment.

3. Events leading up to and during the Montara Oil Spill Disaster

The Montara oil spill has its origins in 1988 when the Montara oil reserves were first discovered. From that time on a series of events, including the buying and selling of acreage blocks and permits (and associated resource companies), and the referral and approval of actions under the EPBC Act with severely limited conditions, were the precursors to the oil spill disaster. These and a detailed account of events during the spill emergency, are summarised in the Timeline included in Appendix 1.

What the timeline reveals is inadequate controls over an industry that is able to buy and sell access to the marine environment with little regulatory oversight, an approvals process that does little to protect the marine environment from the impacts of the industry, and a monitoring and emergency response framework that is inadequate to measure and deal with the impacts of the petroleum industry.

4. Lessons from the Montara Oil Spill Disaster

1. Threat of petroleum development on the marine environment

The Kimberley is one of the few remaining intact and almost completely undeveloped coastal areas left on Earth. The Montara oil and gas spill shows that the petroleum industry poses a high risk for the marine environment – this is a warning about the dangers of massive industrial developments in sensitive natural environments such as the near-pristine land and

seascapes of the Kimberley region. The scale of the new developments proposed in the Kimberley dwarf the development that is responsible for this spill.

The western Kimberley is also one of the last remaining strongholds in the entire country where our iconic wildlife remains safe from invasive species. This area needs to be protected from disasters like this, as well as big developments and threats like invasive species.

Recently in the United States, the Federal Government's top ocean scientists within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have recommended that the US Government drastically reduce plans to open the coast to offshore oil and gas drilling due to the threats and potentially devastating effects of oil spills to marine life. Australian should pay heed to such policy shifts.

2. The need for marine sanctuaries

The Montara oil spill highlights how critical it is that we establish large highly-protected marine sanctuaries to protect the marine environment and also have buffer zones between them and petroleum production.

3. Ministerial and whole-of-government responsibilities to minimise harm to the marine environment

All parts of the Federal Government should ensure that they do not harm the marine environment through the work they do. Minister Ferguson sent the wrong message to the petroleum industry he is supposed to be managing when he said to an interviewer that 'environmental considerations are not my considerations' when commenting on the oil spill. It was also disingenuous for Minister Ferguson to claim "Look, there's no way the environment is at risk" with an oil slick that covered an area of the marine environment almost the same size as Tasmania and at a time when there was no clear end to the spill in sight. Ensuring a healthy Australian marine environment is everyone's responsibility.

All governments need to learn from this environmental disaster and do everything possible to ensure the environment of the Kimberley and other marine regions is protected. That includes revisiting the environmental assessment process that currently only looks at development on a project-by-project basis, rather than at the combined or cumulative impacts for a region.

4. A failure of government and industry communications

During the event the community was poorly served by the extremely limited release of information about the extent and impacts of the spill. The Federal Government and industry were unwilling or unable to say what marine impacts were occurring during the oil spill crisis. This also indicated inadequate monitoring of the marine environment. The company itself was unprepared to reveal the cause even though it admitted knowing the cause (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 November 2009, 'We know what caused oil spill'). One industry insider went as far to say that the cause of the spill was caused by 'poor decision making and corporate greed' (*The Age* 10 November 2009, 'Cause of WA oil spill revealed'). In that story the insider claimed that PTTEP was trying to save time and failed to cap the well properly.

To overcome this 'out-of-sight and out-of-mind' attitude, to highlight ACF concerns with the size of the spill area, and to increase community awareness about the size and potential

impact of the spill, ACF produced a series of maps which placed the spill area adjacent to some of Australia's capital cities. These are reproduced in Appendix 2.

5. A failure of regulatory oversight

If comments by a US official in an interview on ABC radio are accurate, the West Atlas rig would never have been approved for drilling in the US marine environment because it didn't have the triple redundancy required by their regulatory regime. This indicates a failure of regulatory oversight by the Australian Minister for Resources and Energy. There is now an urgent need for a review of regulations over the petroleum industry to ensure these incidents are avoided or minimised in the future.

6. Inadequate emergency response equipment

The response by the Australian Marine Safety Authority was prompt but undermined by a lack of sufficient equipment to clean up the spill. The oil recovery operation using booms and skimmer ships could only capture the amount of oil escaping each day (and only on good weather days). It was unable to make inroads into the oil that spilled into the ocean prior to the recovery equipment arriving or keep up with the leakage when conditions were less than perfect. This highlights inadequacies in the industry and Federal Government's oil spill response framework in a region where disasters of this kind could become more frequent as the industry expands there. Dispersants can do as much, if not more, harm than oil, especially as they can lead to a concentration of oil on the sea bed.

7. A failure in monitoring and data collection

Environmental monitoring prior to the disaster and during the disaster response was completely inadequate. A science team engaged by the Federal Environment Minister spent less than a week in the area and was severely limited in the geographical scope of their investigation. A long-term, comprehensive and publicly transparent environmental monitoring project is critical for the Kimberley region, but there is also a need for a major expansion of public good research (not industry-biased research) in all of Australia's marine regions.

There was also a lack of reliable data on the rate of flow from the leaking well head. Appropriate and adequate systems should be in place to provide accurate data on flow rates to assist with oil spill response and clean-up efforts.

8. A failure to consider the cumulative impacts of development

The combined impacts of oil and gas development and other uses in pristine areas like the Kimberley have not been considered. This is a key problem in the Federal Government's decision making, with proposals and their approvals being considered on only a project-by-project basis. The Kimberley LNG hub site assessment and national heritage assessment processes are underway in the Kimberley but these alone do not ensure the natural environment will be safe from such incidents.

9. A more realistic attitude needed towards to industry claims on its management practices: Companies promise 'world's best environmental practice', yet these disasters still happen. It should be noted that the blow-out occurred on a day of calm sea conditions – what might

have occurred in the cyclone season? Our environmental protection processes need to be more realistic about the promises of companies (in impact assessments). We need to expect and plan for the worst, and to offer no protection of liabilities (at taxpayer expense) e.g. like Gorgon and the geosequestration and the recent battle over oil-spill clean up in Queensland.

Appendix 1: Montara Oil Spill Disaster timeline

This timeline charts the key events since the discovery of the Montara oil reserves through to the oils spill, the response to it and the establishment of the Montara Commission of Inquiry.

Date	Event
March 1988	Montara oil reserves discovered
2001	Purchase of ACRL/3 Montara Gas and Oil Field by Newfield
6 November 2001	EPBC Act referral by Newfield Australia for the establishment of an exploration well at Montara 3 in AC/RL3 block
28 November 2001	Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH) determines that the referred action is not a controlled action
2002	Montara 3 drilled and tested
February 2002	Newfield's application to renew the Retention Lease over the Montara oil and gas field (AC/RL3) is renewed after it drafted a joint technical report that was accepted by the Commonwealth
7 August 2002	Under EPBC Act Newfield refers its action to drill two production wells in Montara 4 and 5. The drilling would commence in 2004 in water depths of 80-100 metres. Montara 6 was to follow 6 months later. Establishing the well would occur in 2003 and production would occur for 5-10 years
29 August 2002	DEH determines that the referred action of 7 August is a controlled action under s23 EPBC Act in relation to the Commonwealth Marine Area (a Matter of National Environmental Significance under the Act)
12 May 2003	DEH notified that Newfield has advertised its intentions for the Montara Development project and released for public comment a Preliminary Information document
3 September 2003	Newfield Australia's referred action on Montara 4,5 and 6 Oil Production Wells, and Montara 3 Gas Re-Injection Well is approved with 6 conditions which cover oil spill contingency, decommissioning of the infrastructure, monitoring produced formation water, a certificate of compliance in relation to the conditions, a revised plan and also the power of the Minister to seek revisions to the plans required under the conditions
September 2003	Coogee Resources takes over as operator of Montara field and acquires Newfield Australia. Coogee Resources also acquires producing Jabiru and Challis fields nearby
28 June 2004	Coogee Resources conducts week-long gathering of geotechnical data for an infrastructure site to support the Montara project
April 2006	The discovery of two new major fields – Swift and Swallow – prove the commercial viability of the Montara project. The project at Montara will be developed in two phases, the first will involve drilling production wells at Montara H1 and H4 and the second phase drilling production wells at H2 and H3 and one gas injection well at G1. Each well will be drilled through the Montara Wellhead Platform
14 November 2006	Media reports reveal that Coogee Resources is seeking to raise $380m in public offer to develop the Montara project. It is also seeking to raise another $318m in debt for the project estimated to cost $588m to develop
1 May 2007	Banker 'Babcock and Brown' announces that it is providing funding (reported to be around a $300m equity package) to Coogee Resources to develop the Montara field which is expected to begin production in the third quarter of 2008. This replaces the public float that Coogee Resources had planned (Babcock and Brown would later spectacularly collapse during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009)
2007-2009	Coogee Resources continues development and construction of the Montara project. Coogee intends to use a floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) facility as a hub on its Montara field and tie in the Skua, Swift North and Swallow satellite fields

16 October 2008	Reported that Babcock and Brown sold its 35% stake in the Coogee Resources Montara project. The development of the project now hinges on the sale of Coogee which was put on the market (small companies were finding it difficult to fund projects). The Montara project, which had been due to start in December 2008 and was then likely to start in April 2009, had been delayed due to problems with contractors according to Coogee Resources. The project is expected to produce 29,000 barrels per day of light, low-sulphur crude. Total reserves are estimated at 39.9 million barrels
February 2009	PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Australasia Limited (PTTEP AA) acquires Coogee Resources. PTTEP (the holding company of PTTEP AA) is Thailand's national petroleum exploration and production company
June 2009	Reported that the Federal Government signs off on the Montara oil spill contingency plan (one of the conditions set down in the 2003 approval)
21 August 2009	The Montara H1 production well on the Montara Wellhead Platform next to the West Atlas jack-up rig blows out. The well begins to leak sweet light crude oil, gas and condensate. The cause was not publically revealed. The platform is located 690 kilometres west of Darwin, 250 kilometres off the far north Kimberley coast and 150 kilometres south-east of Ashmore Reef. The project was at the drilling and development stage, not the production stage. The National Plan for Action on Oil Pollution is activated. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has primary responsibility to respond to the spill and carry out clean-up measures under the requirements of 'The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and other Noxious and Hazardous Substances'
23 August2009	ACF and other groups identify the area as a globally significant marine life superhighway that has less than less than 1% protection. A network of large marine sanctuaries is needed as a buffer for marine life to the expansion of oil and gas in the region
	C-130 Hercules aircraft brought in from Singapore on 22 August begins dropping 'Slick Gone' dispersant on the spill amid concerns that the dispersants could have major impacts on marine life
	The Minister for Energy Resources, Martin Ferguson, tells Meet the Press: 'Look, there's no way the environment is at risk. Perhaps more importantly, I remind you the **environmental considerations are not my considerations** as the Minister for Energy and Resources. It is an entirely separate process in the hands of the Minister for the Environment, Peter Garrett, and he will make a decision in due course. My responsibility is to work with government at a State level and businesses to set up the projects'
24 August 2009	The Australian Greens call for a judicial inquiry into the blow-out and spill
25 August 2009	Woodside Petroleum offers a rig to PTTEP to help cap the blow-out
27 August 2009	The West Triton rig leaves Indonesia bound for Montara to drill the relief well. The plan is to drill a hole into the leaking oil well, pump mud into the hole and alleviate pressure to stop its flow. It will need to drill 2.6km into the seabed and make contact with a 25cm casing to achieve this
28 August 2009	Representatives of the Australian Greens fly over spill area and announce that the spill extends well beyond the area claimed by government authorities
30 August 2009	Australian Greens call for comprehensive monitoring of marine life and the spill by the federal government
	Slick area estimated at 6500 square kilometres from SkyTruth
	Reports that PTTEP continuing to reject offer of a rig from Woodside Petroleum
2 September 2009	Spill is nearing Indonesian waters
3 September 2009	Slick area estimated at 15,000 square kilometres from SkyTruth
4 September 2009	Fishers return to Broome from the slick area with dead marine life. Four dead fish collected are stored frozen in Broome for further analysis. They are saddletail snapper,

	crimson snapper, yellowspotted rockcod and goldband snapper
6 September 2009	Environment Minister Garrett exempts from EPBC Act the action by PTTEP to cap the blow-out
7 September 2009	Environment Minister Garrett indicates that he is in talks with PTTEP over a long-term monitoring program for the Montara project
	AMSA engages toxicologist Dr Monique Ganyon at Curtin University to conduct a contaminants analysis of the four dead fish stored in Broome
9 September 2009	Scientist Dr Jamie Oliver from Australian Institute of Marine Sciences warns that prolonged use of dispersants could harm coral reefs in the area
	Resources and Energy Minister Ferguson tables an amendment to Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 to provide for a broad-ranging major incident investigation power. It passes the House of Representatives. He indicates that an inquiry will be established once the blow-out is capped
11 September 2009	The West Triton rig arrives at the West Atlas rig and Montara Wellhead Platform after a 2963km journey
12 September 2009	The West Triton rig is used to make the first attempt to plug the leak by drilling 2.6km under the seabed to intersect a casing just 25 cm in diameter. The plan is to intercept the leak from the new well and fill it with streams of heavy mud
15 September 2009	Environs Kimberley suggests that the lack of blow-out protectors during the PTTEP operation could be the cause of the blow out
17 September 2009	The Senate supports an Australian Greens motion that urges the Federal Government to ensure that the proposed oil spill inquiry is comprehensive i.e. covers environmental impacts, the appropriateness of the response, how good the national plan is, coordination between the players
	Scientist Simon Mustoe reports that up to 30,000 individual sea snakes and 16,000 turtles may be found in the area affected by the oil leak's slick. His estimates are contained in a report to WWF - *Montara Field Oil Leak and Biodiversity Values*
	Lieutenant Governor of California, John Garamendi, warns of the dangers of oil production off the California coast and cites the Kimberley oil spill to support his case to a US Oceans Policy Task Force hearing
18 September 2009	Reports of seabirds dying when coming into contact with the spill
24 September 2009	A team of scientists head out on a WWF voyage to the oil spill to assess its impacts on marine life
	Environment Minister Garrett engages a team of scientists led by Dr James Watson of the University of Queensland to survey the slick area
25 September 2009	Announced that PTTEP has bought the Timor Sea interests of the Austrian company OMV. These comprise three exploration permits and four small undeveloped oil discoveries and are found in the Audacious and Tenacious fields: blocks AC/RL4&5, AC/RL6, AC/P4, AC/P17, and AC/P24
	The team of scientists led by Dr James Watson head out to monitor the oil slick
4 October 2009	Dr James Watson and his team return from their survey, having spent five days monitoring at sea in an area of 990 square kilometres and three days surveying three islands that are part of the Ashmore Reef
6 October 2009	An open letter by ACF and other NGOs to oil companies calling on them to support marine sanctuaries appears as a full-page ad in the West Australian newspaper
	The first attempt by PTTEP to cap the blowout fails
13 October 2009	The second attempt by PTTEP to cap the blowout fails
18 October 2009	The third attempt by PTTEP to cap the blowout fails
20 October 2009	AMSA reveals that oil spill clean-up has thus far cost $5.3m
	Reports that Indonesian fishers are catching fish that are making villagers ill
21 October 2009	Answers to Senate estimates questions reveal that flow of oil from leak could be up to

	2000 barrels per day. This would make it Australia's worst oil spill.
23 October 2009	The fourth attempt by PTTEP to cap the blowout is postponed
	The federal government releases a *Report on biopsy collections from specimens collected from the surrounds of the West Atlas oil leak – fish specimens* by Dr Monique Ganyon of Curtin University (completed on 29 September 2009) claiming that the tests show that there has been no contamination of fish. However, in the media Dr Ganyon raises doubts about the testing because the fish bile was not made available for testing. Freezing of the four fish had precluded examination of bile, the best guide to oil contamination. Dr Gabyon said that oil by-products could accumulate in bile '1000 times higher' than in the flesh of the fish, and so testing of bile would have been a better guide to contamination
	Essential Research poll shows that 79% of Australians believe it is likely that the oil spill of the Kimberley coast in Western Australia will cause long-term damage to the natural environment, including marine life
	WWF Australia releases its report from its voyage to the Kimberley slick area. The expedition observes hundreds of marine creatures, including dolphins and sea birds, sea snakes and threatened hawksbill and flatback turtles in the spill area
24 October 2009	Federal government approves the PTTEP purchase of additional Timor Sea petroleum acreage blocks
26 October 2009	Stuart Petroleum announces the sale of its Timor Sea interests to PTTEP for $8m. The tenement includes its Oliver field, which is thought to have at least 20 million barrels of oil, nine million barrels of LPG, 14 million barrels of condensate and 348 billion cubic feet of original gas in place
	PTTEP meets with competitors to discuss capping the blowout. The companies at the meeting are Woodside, Inpex, Vermillion, AGR Petroleum Services and Apache (which sent drilling experts to the meeting. Also attending was the Texan company Boots & Coots, experts in the field of capping blowouts
	Pollution from the spill is reported to have damaged more than 1,000 hectares of ready-to-harvest seaweed along the coastal area of Rote Island, East Nusa Tenggara in Indonesia
	6500 Australians and overseas online petitioners demand action on future oil spills calling on the federal government to: ensure the oil spill off the Kimberley coast is capped as soon as possible; commission an independent enquiry to investigate how Australia can be better prepared to respond to similar disasters in the future; create a network of large marine sanctuaries which buffer and protect the most important parts of the Australian marine environment from polluting development
27 October 2009	Fourth attempt by PTTEP to cap the blowout is again delayed
	The Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society (WDCS) calls for a tougher regulatory environment for the petroleum industry and comprehensive monitoring
28 October 2009	APPEA Executive Officer Mark McCallum publicly critical of the PTTEP handling of the blowout and says that it has tarnished the petroleum industry's environmental record
29 October 2009	PTTEP announces that the cost of the blowout is more than $177m
30 October 2009	Environment Minister Garrett releases *A rapid assessment of the impacts of the Montara oil leak on birds, cetaceans and marine reptiles* which the Government says shows the need for the long-term monitoring agreed to with PTTEP. The report was carried out by Dr James Watson of the University of Queensland. After surveying for five days at sea and 3 days on Ashmore Reef, Dr Watson finds that seabirds are entering the slick area in pursuit of fish that seem to be attracted to the spill
31 October 2009	Reports form Indonesia (*Jakarta Post*) that tests confirm contamination of Indonesian waters
	Dr James Watson reported in media saying that the 'presence of dying birds and dead sea snakes suggest that there is an immediate risk to species utilising the water that has

	been affected by the oil slick'. His team counted 462 whales and dolphins, 2801 birds, 62 sea snakes and 25 turtles in the affected areas over five days of observation at sea. The federal government restricted his team's survey to the waters on the Indonesian side of the oil slick
1 November 2009	PTTEP fails in its fourth attempt to cap the blowout. Although the company intercepts the well casing 2.6 kilometres below the seabed and begins to pump in mud, a fire breaks out on the platform and rig and the operation is abandoned
2 November 2009	The blow-out occurred on 21 August and has been spilling oil for 74 days. It is estimated that up to 2000 barrels of oil (plus condensate) could be leaking per day (the company estimates 400 barrels per day). If the flow rate is 400 barrels per day then the total spill would be 29,600 barrels or around 4.7m litres. This would make the spill the third-worst in Australian history. Using 2000 barrels per day for the 74 days the total spill would be 148,000 barrels or approx. 21,000 tonnes (a tonne is roughly 7 barrels but depends on the density of the oil) or about 23 million litres. This would place it above the *Kirki* in 1991 and *Princess Anne Marie* in 1975, both also off the WA coast and the worst and second-worst spills in Australian history. The Exxon Valdez spill was 250,000 barrels of oil. The Australian Greens estimate that the spill could be between 10 and 20 million litres
3 November 2009	PTTEP succeeds in capping the blow-out and extinguishing the fire
4 November 2009	PTTEP reported in Sydney Morning Herald as saying that it knows the cause of the blowout but declines to reveal it
5 November 2009	Resources and Energy Minister Ferguson announces the Montara Commission of Inquiry to be headed by the former Secretary of DEWHA, David Borthwick, and due to report in April 2010. The terms of reference include the cause of the spill; whether the regulatory regime governing the oil-drilling operation was adequate; the performance of relevant people acting under that regime; the adequacy of the response; and the environmental impact of the spill
10 November 2009	Industry insider reported in The Age saying that the cause of the spill was due to PTTEP trying to save money and so failing to properly cap the well.
22 December 2009	Due date for submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry.

Appendix 2: Relative size of the Montara Oil Spill Disaster

Fig 1: Placement of the Kimberley Oil spill adjacent to Australian capital cities



Fig 2: Adelaide and the oil spill area



Fig 3: Bass Strait and Melbourne and the oil spill area

Figure 4: Brisbane and the oil spill area



Figure 5: Perth and the oil spill area



Figure 6: Sydney and the oil spill area